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NOTES
AMENDING THE JONES ACT TO PROVIDE JONES ACT
SEAMEN FULL RECOVERY IN GENERAL MARITIME
NEGLIGENCE AFTER MILES v. APEX MARINE CORP.
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 1991, seaman Kenneth Sugden drowned while working
aboard the tug boat Puerto Nuevo.' Sugden was in the process of
retrieving a barge from a dock when he fell through a protective cover and
into the barge's recently installed "moon pool."2 Sugden's estate filed a
wrongful death action under the federal maritime law to recover nonpecu-
niary damages against the shipyard.3 Sugden's case presents a typical
example of a controversial issue the admiralty bench has faced since 1988:
may a Jones Act4 plaintiff recover nonpecuniary damages from a
nonemployer third-party tortfeasor for negligence under the general
maritime law after Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.?'
After the issue floated around the admiralty courts for a number of years,
the Supreme Court addressed the proper maritime wrongful death remedy
under the general maritime law in Miles. The Court held that the Jones
Act, which allows recovery only for pecuniary loss, precludes a true
seaman6 from recovering punitive and nonpecuniary damages in a general
I. Sugden v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 796 F. Supp. 455, 456 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
2. Id. Duwamish Shipyard, Inc., installed a "moon pool" on the barge. "The moon pool is a
tubular pipe, approximately four feet in diameter, that runs from the bottom of the barge's hull to the
top deck. Pursuant to its work agreement with [the barge owner and operator], Duwamish also built
a cover to be installed on the deck of the barge over the moon pool." Id.
3. Sugden's estate sued both his employer, Puget Sound Tug & BargelCrowley Maritime Corp.,
and the third-party shipyard, Duwamish Shipyard, Inc. Although the actions were combined, the estate
claimed against the employer for pecuniary losses pursuant to the Jones Act and against the third party
for pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages under a general maritime law negligence action. The third-
party defendant argued that nonpecuniary claims were not allowed because Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
489 U.S. 19 (1990), bars a seaman's recovery of nonpecuniary damages in all suits under the general
maritime law. The district court rejected this argument. Sugden, 796 F. Supp. at 456.
4. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
5. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
6. In admiralty, the term "seaman," used either as an adjective or a noun, is a legal term of art.
It describes a person, man or woman, who meets the following criteria: (1) is a crew member of a
vessel in navigation, i.e., a vessel that is not permanently stationary such as a drydock or an offshore
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maritime wrongful death action.7
There are four basic theories upon which a true seaman may base a claim
for recovery when suffering a personal injury or wrongful death. The first
is a Jones Act negligence cause of action The Jones Act, enacted by
Congress in 1920, extends to seamen the same rights and remedies granted
to railway workers through the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).9
The second is a claim based on the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA), 0 also enacted by Congress in 1920. The DOHSA allows
recovery of pecuniary damages by the surviving beneficiaries of anyone
killed on the high seas. The third and fourth are general maritime law
actions for unseaworthiness of the ship or for negligence." Because each
of these claims is conceptually distinct, a plaintiff may elect to bring a
complaint on several claims in order to assure some recovery, or the
plaintiff may elect to choose only one such claim. 2 Until Miles, the
damages recoverable by the plaintiff varied depending upon the theory
under which recovery was sought. Punitive damages were traditionally
recoverable under the general maritime unseaworthiness and negligence
actions, but not under the Jones Act. 3 The maritime plaintiff, therefore,
oil rig; (2) is permanently attached or assigned to the vessel; and (3) has duties contributing to the
function or mission of the vessel. See McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 357 (1991);
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 5-5 (1987); James A. George, The
'Triple Crown' ofAdmiralty Cases, TRIAL, Oct. 1991, at 46. The term "seaman" or "seamen" is used
extensively throughout this Note and always refers to a person who meets all three prongs of the test.
For the purposes of this Note, "seaman" is synonymous with "true seaman" and "Jones Act seaman."
A Jones Act seaman is one who qualifies for recovery under the Jones Act, i.e,, he meets the standard
set out in Wilander. Although the term "seaman" is used, it is not to be construed in any way other
than as generic. The Court has not yet found an appropriate and applicable gender-neutral term to
describe the "seaman" crew member, and it is not a purpose of this Note to recommend one.
7. Miles, 498 U.S. at 37.
8. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1988). The Jones Act does not explicitly state that it is an action
predicated on negligence, but it does rely on the negligence-based remedies granted to railway
employees in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
9. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). The Jones Act applies to seaman all federal statutes "modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees." 46
U.S.C. app. § 688(a).
10. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988).
11. Seaworthiness is a shipowner's warranty to the seaman of the ship's fitness for duty. The
shipowner has an absolute duty to provide a vessel that is fit for its intended purpose. Mitchell v.
Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946);
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). Unseaworthiness, therefore, is the failure to meet
this obligation. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, §§ 4-5, 5-3.
12. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 5-3.
13. See Dyer v. Merry Shipping Co., 650 F.2d 622, 625 (Sth Cir. 1981) ("Punitive damages should
be available when a shipowner has willfully violated the duty to furnish and maintain a seaworthy
380
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could plead both a statutory claim and a general maritime claim and
recover punitive and other nonpecuniary damages under the general
maritime law even though this recovery was unavailable under the statutes.
The Supreme Court eliminated this inconsistency to some degree in
Miles, holding that a Jones Act seaman14 may not recover nonpecuniary
or punitive damages from his employer under a general maritime wrongful
death action based on unseaworthiness. 5 Noting that the Jones Act
precluded the recovery of nonpecuniary losses, the Court reasoned that it
could not sanction a more expansive remedy than that already given
plaintiffs by Congress.' 6 The practical result of Miles is a sharp reduction
in the potential recoverable damages available to a maritime wrongful death
plaintiff. 7 Subsequent district court decisions have relied on Miles to
preclude recovery of nonpecuniary and punitive damages by injured Jones
Act claimants against their employers. 8 Thus, after Miles the district
courts have consistently ruled that a true seaman may recover only
pecuniary damages against his employer for wrongful death or personal
injury.
Although the Miles decision definitively resolved the employer liability
issue, it left open the question whether the Court has also eliminated the
vessel."). But see Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that punitive
damages are not recoverable under the Jones Act). The court did not address the issue of punitive
damages under the general maritime law, however, because the jury found the vessel seaworthy. Id.
at 560. See also Paul S. Edelman, Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Issues of Jury Trials and Punitive
Damages, in MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION: JURISDICTION AND DAMAGES 29, 59-69
(American Bar Ass'n ed., 1991); George L. Waddell, Punitive Damages in Admiralty, 19 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 65 (1988); Jill Rakoff Loxsom, Case Comment, Recognition of Punitive Damages Under the
Jones Act and General Maritime Law, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 251 (1981); Michael P. Maslanka,
Case Comment, Punitive Damages in the Admiralty, 5 MARITIME L. 223 (1980).
14. See supra note 6.
15. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990).
16. Id. at 36.
17. George, supra note 6, at 53.
18. See, e.g., Ellison v. Messerschmitt-Blokow-Blohm, 807 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Tex. 1992);
Reynolds v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 796 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1992); McAleer v. Smith, 791 F.
Supp. 923 (D.R.I. 1992); La Voie v. Kualoa Ranch and Activity Club, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 827 (D. Haw.
1992); Turley v. Co-Mar Offshore Marine Corp., 766 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. La. 1991); Complaint of
Aleutian Enterprise, Ltd., 777 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Dunbar v. American Commercial Barge
Lines Co., 771 F. Supp. 151 (M.D. La. 1991); Breland v. Western Oceanic, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 718
(W.D. La. 1991); In re MARDOC Asbestos Case Clusters 1,2,5, and 6, 768 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Mich.
1991) (extending application of Miles to general maritime injury actions so as to preclude the recovery
of all nonpecuniary or exemplary damages). See also Duplaintis v. Texaco, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 787
(E.D. La. 1991); Bourque v. Mallard Workover and Drilling, Inc., No. 89-1502 (W.D. La. 1991)
(adopting narrow interpretation of Miles and not extending Miles beyond claims for loss of society or
consortium).
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
seaman's right to recover nonpecuniary and exemplary damages from a
third-party tortfeasor in a general maritime law negligence action.' A
true seaman is currently permitted to file a general maritime negligence
action against any negligent third party, even though such a claimant may
already be compensated for all pecuniary damages under DOHSA, the
Jones Act or an unseaworthiness claim. Thus, by proceeding against the
third party, the plaintiff may be able to obtain a fuller compensation than
would be possible in a suit against only an employer, notwithstanding the
Court's determination in Miles that all true seamen are entitled to a uniform
recovery without regard to the cause of action.
In sum, then, the true seaman suing under the Jones Act cannot recover
nonpecuniary damages, but the same seaman may recover nonpecuniary
damages when suing for negligence under the general maritime law. It is
unclear whether the policy considerations articulated by the Court in Miles
with respect to Jones Act seamen and unseaworthiness in the general
maritime law are to be broadly construed and applied so that the Jones Act
precludes true seamen from nonpecuniary recovery against negligent
non-employer third parties.
This Note argues that the recovery limitations levied by the Supreme
Court in Miles result in a misplaced priority on uniformity in admiralty
without regard to the subtextual problems of the Jones Act. Part II briefly
reviews the various wrongful death remedies available to the Jones Act
seaman. Part m examines the applicability of the Uniformity Doctrine to
maritime wrongful death. Part IV distinguishes the full recovery against
third parties in another federal no-fault injury compensation scheme: the
Longshoreman and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Part V analyzes
the recent cases permitting Jones Act seamen to recover punitive and other
nonpecuniary damages from nonemployer third-party tortfeasors. Part VI
concludes that pursuant to the Uniformity Doctrine Congress must amend
the Jones Act to provide a full pecuniary and nonpecuniary recovery for the
wrongful death of a true seaman.
19. See Sugden v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 796 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Mussa
v. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Rebstock v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, 764
F. Supp. 75 (E.D. La. 1991).
[VOL. 72:379
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II. A REVIEW OF THE MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH REMEDIES: THE
BASIS FOR LIABILITY AND THE EXTENT OF RECOVERABLE DAMAGES
AVAILABLE TO THE JONES ACT SEAMAN
There are four causes of action that an admiralty plaintiff may file to
recover for a maritime wrongful death or personal injury:20 the Death on
the High Seas Act,2" the Jones Act,' the general maritime unseaworthi-
ness claim ' and the general maritime negligence claim.24 A true seaman
may recover under any single claim or under a combination of the claims
for full satisfaction for his injuries." The ultimate result, however, is that
after Miles2 6 a seaman cannot recover anything more than pecuniary losses
from his employer under any claim or combination of claims.27 This Part
will consider each of the four causes of action in an effort to determine the
possible remedies available to the seaman plaintiff prior to Miles.28 Each
cause of action will be reviewed as if Kenneth Sugden, the seaman
introduced above, had been the decedent.
A. Death on the High Seas Act
Congress passed the Death on the High Seas Act" (DOHSA) in
response to the federal judiciary's application of state wrongful death
statutes3 where death was occurring on the "high seas," i.e., beyond the
20. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 7-1, at 235 ("A crazy-quilt pattern of wrongful
death actions is recognized in admiralty. . .. Wrongful death in admiralty is best approached by
considering separately each liability system, the basis of liability, the extent of recoverable damages,
and whether or not other liability regimes can be used in conjunction with it.').
21. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988).
22. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
23. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, §§ 4-5, 5-3, 7-3.
24. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, §§ 4-2, 7-3.
25. See id. §§ 7-3 to 7-4.
26. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
27. Id.
28. The changes after Miles will be considered through analysis of applicable case law. See infra
part V.
29. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
30. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988). Section 761 provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring
on the high seas beyond one marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of
Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative
of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States,
in admiralty ....
Id. app. § 761.
31. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 398 (1970).
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three-mile territorial limit.32 DOHSA ended the inconsistency due to the
lack of a federal remedy by providing for uniform recovery.33 Access to
the DOHSA remedy is very broad-one qualifies as a DOHSA plaintiff if
the decedent's death occurred on the high seas.34 If the decedent was a
true seaman,35 then liability may be based on either negligence36 or
unseaworthiness. 3
7
Pursuant to congressional intent, DOHSA preempts all state wrongful
death statutes.38  DOHSA also preempts the wrongful death action for
negligence or unseaworthiness under the general maritime law which
provided the exclusive death remedy for unseaworthiness when a true
seaman was killed on the high seas.39 The result is that if a seaman dies
while sailing the high seas due to negligence or unseaworthiness of the
ship, he is limited to the DOHSA remedy, which is explicitly limited to
pecuniary damages. 40
If Kenneth Sugden had drowned in waters at least three miles away from
shore, then his beneficiaries' only recovery would have been via DOHSA
under the strict liability unseaworthiness theory against the tug owner or
under the higher burden negligence theory against the third-party shipyard
or both. In either case, his beneficiaries could have recovered only for
pecuniary losses.
B. The Jones Act
Congress enacted a second statue providing a remedy for maritime
32. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761. One marine league is equal to a distance of three nautical miles or 3041
fathoms, estimated roughly at three miles. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (6th ed. 1990).
33. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 7-1.
34. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761. See supra note 32.
35. See supra note 6.
36. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761.
37. See Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958); Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 399-401 (1970).
38. See Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
39. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), amended by Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Bodden v. American Offshore, Inc., 681 F.2d 319, 329 (5th Cir.
1982) ("When the incident takes place outside the three-mile limit, DOHSA and DOHSA alone
controls.').
40. 46 U.S.C. app. § 762. Section 762 states:
The recovery in such a suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss
sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be apportioned among
them by the court in proportion to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of the
death of the person by whose representative the suit is brought.
[VOL. 72:379
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wrongful death or personal injury in 1920, popularly known as the Jones
Act.4' The Jones Act filled yet another void created after the enactment
of DOHSA. After DOHSA, a seaman decedent killed on land could
recover under the state wrongful death statute and the decedent seaman
killed on waters beyond three miles from shore would recover under
DOHSA, but there was no recovery for the seaman unfortunate enough to
die on navigable waters within the three-mile territorial limit.42 The Jones
Act rectified this coverage gap by creating a cause of action. Recovery,
however, was limited to only those persons who qualify as true seamen.
The Jones Act incorporates the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA),43 extending to seamen the same rights and benefits granted to
railway employees by the 1908 railway statute. Like DOHSA, the Jones
Act preempts state wrongful death statutes.' Liability under the Jones
Act, however, depends on a plaintiff's showing of negligence." Although
there is no remedy under the Jones Act for unseaworthiness,46 if the death
occurs beyond the three-mile limit the Jones Act negligence claim may be
joined with a DOHSA unseaworthiness claim,47 or if the incident occurs
within three miles of the shore, the Jones Act negligence claim may be
joined to a general maritime law unseaworthiness claim."
Although state wrongful death statutes historically provided remedies,49
today the Jones Act is the primary vehicle for a seaman's surviving
41. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
42. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 394-95 (1970). For a good, general
discussion of the anomalies in early maritime wrongful death remedies and legislation, see Paul S.
Edelman, Recovery for Wrongful Death Under General Maritime Law, 55 TuL. L. REv. 1123, 1128-33
(1981).
43. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
44. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
45. See id. at 154. See also Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
46. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 154.
47. See Doyle v. Albatross Tanker Corp., 260 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aftd, 367 F.2d 465
(2d Cir. 1966).
48. See Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v. Ratliff, 797 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1986). See also Smith
v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980); Holdan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.
1980); Landry v. Two R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1975).
49. In an 1886 case, The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), overruled by Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the general maritime law did not
recognize a wrongful death cause of action for persons killed on the high seas or navigable waters, and
that aggrieved parties had to rely on state statutes. Id. at 213. Since that decision, nearly every state
has enacted wrongful death statutes. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 23 (1990).
Admiralty courts were forced to apply these statutes because of the lack of any federal legislation. See
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 7-1. Under this rather haphazard system, the courts reached inconsistent
results. Id.
19941
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beneficiaries to recover from the employer for wrongful death and personal
injury." The no-fault liability Jones Act requires the plaintiff to show
only that he is a true seaman and that the injury occurred while in the
ship's employ.5 After determining that the plaintiff qualifies as a true
seaman, the only issue to litigate is the amount of plaintiff's recoverable
damages. 2
When Congress drafted the Jones Act, it extended to the seaman plaintiff
all of the rights and remedies it previously gave railway employees in
FELA3 so that the plaintiff seaman could maintain an action for "damag-
es" at law. 4 FELA, however, is not clear on the subject of damages. It
states only that the railway employers shall be liable in "damages" for the
death or injury of the protected employee.55  The Supreme Court
considered the question of applicable damages in Michigan Central
Railroad Co. v. Vreeland,56 one of the earliest cases applying FELA. In
Vreeland, the Court explained that the language of FELA essentially
incorporated the language of the first wrongful death statute known as Lord
Campbell's Act.57
The Vreeland Court held that the distinguishing features of Lord
Campbell's Act were identical to the 1908 version of FELA because the
damages had to result from the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits of the
deceased had he not died.58 Congress passed the Jones Act into law
almost eight years after the Court established the ancestry of FELA in
Vreeland.59 Presuming, as the Supreme Court did in Vreeland, that
Congress was aware of the existing law when enacting legislation," the
incorporation of FELA also resulted in the incorporation of its pecuniary
50. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 7-4. The Jones Act completely preempts the
application of state wrongful death statutes to maritime wrongful deaths. Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
51. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a).
52. See McDermott Int'l v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342-355 (1991). The Court discussed the
various historical definitions of a Jones Act seaman and held that a Jones Act seaman should be defined
"solely in terms of [his] connection to a vessel in navigation," and thus, "it is not necessary that a
seaman aid in navigation or contribute to the transportation of the vessel, but a seaman must be doing
the ship's work." Id. at 817.
53. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
54. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688.
55. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
56. 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
57. Id. at 69. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (Eng.).
58. Vreeland, 227 U.S. at 70.
59. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990).
60. Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979)).
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limitations-it has been well settled, then, that the Jones Act provides only
for pecuniary damages.61
For Kenneth Sugden's survivors, the Jones Act represents the only
vehicle for recovery against the employer. Because it is a no-fault liability
statute, they need only prove Sugden's status as a seaman, that he fell into
the moon pool while in the course of his employment, and that they
sustained a certain measure of pecuniary losses. The Jones Act, however,
does not permit a negligence action against the third-party shipyard."
C. General Maritime Law: Unseaworthiness
In addition to, or as an alternative to the statutory remedies discussed
above, an injured seaman may plead the general maritime law concept of
unseaworthiness as the grounds for his recovery. 3 The Supreme Court
established the wrongful death remedy under the general maritime law of
either unseaworthiness or negligence in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc.," after overruling contrary controlling precedent." Basically,
seaworthiness is a shipowner's promise to the seaman of the ship's fitness
for duty.66  The duty imposed on the shipowner is an absolute duty to
provide a vessel that is fit for its intended purpose.67 This duty is distinct
from a negligence claim68 under either the Jones Act69 or the general
maritime law.
Although the seaworthiness obligation is absolute and separate from
negligence, an accident alone is not enough for recovery.70 The seaman
plaintiff must also show that the unseaworthiness proximately caused the
injury." This is a more demanding burden than the mere no-fault
causation requirement in a Jones Act claim. The recoverable damages from
61. Id.
62. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). The Jones Act is a strict liability statute providing any seaman
injured in the course of his employment the right to recover damages for the negligence of his
employer. Jones Act liability is extended through the employer to other negligent parties employed by
the employer including agents and independent contractors. Id.
63. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, §§ 4-5, 5-3, 7-3.
64. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
65. See infra part III.C.
66. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
67. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960) (citing Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,
321 U.S. 96 (1944); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946)).
68. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 5-3.
69. See supra part U.B.
70. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 5-3.
71. Id.
1994]
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a successful unseaworthiness claim were traditionally pecuniary damages72
and, until Miles, punitive damages were also available in a few federal
circuits.73  With Miles, the Court disallowed all nonpecuniary and
exemplary damages arising from this action.74
Accordingly, Sugden's estate could file a claim based upon the general
maritime law theory of unseaworthiness in addition to any Jones Act claim.
Sugden's estate would argue that the barge on which he was working was
unfit for the purpose for which it was intended, and thus was unseaworthy.
Given the facts, it would not be difficult to persuade a court that the moon
pool cover was unfit, that this was a breach of the shipowner's duty, that
Sugden sustained injury as a result of the breach, and that the unfit cover
was the proximate cause. By filing an unseaworthiness action in conjunc-
tion with a Jones Act claim a plaintiff covers all the possible theories of
recovery.
D. General Maritime Law: Negligence
Finally, the plaintiff may base a claim on the general maritime law of
negligence. The elements of a maritime negligence claim are essentially
the same as those of a common-law tort negligence claim 75 including
foreseeable consequences.7" Moreover, the possible damages recoverable
under the maritime negligence action mirror those available in a land-based
negligence action, i.e., both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses are
compensable.77 In fact, there is very little difference between a maritime
negligence action and a land-based negligence action except for the locality
of the wrong. An employee, however, may not bring a maritime negli-
gence action against his employer because both the Jones Act and DOHSA
preempt such suits against employers.78
Thus, Kenneth Sugden's surviving beneficiaries could not bring a
maritime negligence action against his employer because of Jones Act
72. Id.
73. See supra note 13.
74. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990).
75. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959), overruled
by Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
76. See, e.g., Petition of Kinsmen Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (applying Palsgrafv.
Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) to admiralty), cert. denied sub nom. Continental Grain Co.
v. City of Buffalo, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
77. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 949-54
(5th ed. 1984), for a discussion of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages recovery in admiralty.
78. See supra notes 50 and 39, respectively, and accompanying text.
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preemption, but they could bring such an action against the third-party
shipyard. By employing a maritime negligence action against the third
party and a Jones Act claim against his employer, Sugden's beneficiaries
could be assured of a full recovery-pecuniary losses from the employer
and nonpecuniary losses from the third-party. The result in Miles, however,
leaves such recovery in doubt. Miles broadly claimed to eliminate all
nonpecuniary recovery from general maritime law without specifying if the
holding was to be narrowly interpreted and limited to unseaworthiness
claims, or to be broadly construed and thus include all general maritime
actions, including negligence claims.79
III. THE UNIFORMITY DOCTRINE IN MARIME WRONGFUL DEATH
A. Maritime Jurisdiction
Article III of the United States Constitution grants original jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts for all admiralty and
maritime cases."0 Within this grant of jurisdiction, there is a marriage of
statutory law"' and judge-made common law, also known as the "general
maritime law." 2 Thus, there are two potentially conflicting sources of
law which judges and practitioners must reconcile into one body under-
standable and applicable to cases arising in admiralty. While the
integration of statutory and common law is not a particularly unique
situation in American jurisprudence, the constitutional grant of admiralty
79. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990) ("Today we restore a uniform rule
applicable to all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or
general maritime law.").
80. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, §
1, c. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority; ... to all Cases of admiralty, and maritime Jurisdiction .... U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1.
81. Congress has the power to legislate on admiralty and maritime matters. See Southern Pac. Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443
(1852).
82. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, §§ 3-1, 4-1.
The general maritime law is a branch of federal common law that furnishes the rule of
decision in admiralty and maritime cases in the absence of preemptive legislation. It is a
body of concepts, principles, and rules, customary and international in its origin, that has been
adopted and expounded by federal courts.
Id. § 4-1, at 121 n.3 (citing The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934)).
19941
Washington University Open Scholarship
390 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 72:379
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court has influenced the role that the
Supreme Court plays in the creation of admiralty and maritime law.83
Because the Constitution grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction,
the Court is not restricted to merely reviewing lower court decisions in
admiralty cases. In admiralty, the federal courts often create the general
maritime law from the bench." As a result, the Court has determined
over time that there are a few very specific and overriding interests which
dictate a strong need for uniformity in admiralty." These interests include
regulating international and domestic waterway commerce86 and protecting
83. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16,20 (1962) ("Congress has largely left
to this Court the responsibility of fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law. This Court has long
recognized its power and responsibility in this area and has exercised that power where necessary to
do so.") (citations omitted). Matter of Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The
Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the federal judiciary has a more expansive role to play
in the development of maritime law than in the development of non-maritime federal common law.")
(citations omitted).
84. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1981). The court observed:
when Congress has not spoken to a particular issue, however, and when there exists a
"significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law," the
Court has found it necessary, in a "few and restricted" instances to develop federal common
law.
Id. (citations omitted).
But see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (refusing to provide for "loss of
society" damages under the general maritime law when Congress had not provided for such damages
in DOHSA).
85. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02 (1970). The court stated:
[T]he Jones Act was intended to achieve "uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction"
by giving seamen a federal right to recover from their employers for negligence regardless
of the location of the injury or death.... Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful
death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies,
removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate
state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts.... Such uniformity not
only will further the concerns of both of the 1920 Acts but also will give effect to the
constitutionally based principle that federal admiralty law should be "a system coextensive
with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country."
Id. at 401-02 (citations omitted). See also Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 596 (1974)
(Powell, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Powell commented:
Writing for the Court [in Moragne], Mr. Justice Harlan stressed the need to "assure uniform
vindication of federal policies .. " The Court has now rejected these guidelines so recently
laid down in Moragne. Disregarding the source of lav endorsed by Moragne, as well as the
concern for uniformity expressed in that opinion, the Court has fashioned a new substantive
right of recovery in conflict with "accepted maritime law".... [T]hese new doctrines are
unsound as a matter of principle, will create difficulty and confusion in the litigation of
admiralty cases, and are very likely to result in duplicative recoveries.
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
86. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 688, 677 (1982). In Richardson, the Court
concluded:
In light of the need for uniform rules governing navigation, the potential impact on maritime
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seamen without regard to their proximity to a particular U.S. legal
jurisdiction."
B. Origins of the Uniformity Doctrine
Traditionally, the twin pillars of the law of admiralty have been: (1) a
"special solicitude" for the welfare of seamen and their families in
recognition of the extremely unique perils and hardships that a seaman's
life requires;88 and (2) the principle of uniformity.89 The Court initially
recognized a need for the uniformity of admiralty law in The
Lottaivanna ° in 1873. The Court held that the nature of admiralty law
requires a system of law which operates with equality on any body of
navigable waters in the country without regard to the local jurisdiction.91
Periodically, the Court reaffirms the existence of this overarching notion in
its maritime decision making. 92 In 1920, Congress enacted legislation to
create causes of action for most maritime wrongful deaths. DOHSA 93
commerce when two vessels collide on navigable waters, and the uncertainty and confusion
that would necessarily accompany a jurisdictional test tied to commercial use of a given boat,
we hold that a complaint alleging a collision between two vessels on navigable waters
properly states a claim within admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Id.
87. See Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 269-70 (1972).
88. Maritime law had always, in this country as in England, been a thing apart from the
common law. It was, to a large extent, administered by different courts; it owed a much
greater debt to the civil law; and, from its focus on particular subject matter, it
developed general principles unknown to the common law. These principles included
a special solicitude for the welfare of those men who undertook to venture upon
hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages.
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-87 (footnotes omitted).
The shaping of the Moragne wrongful death remedy was "guided by the principle of maritime law
that 'certainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give
than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules."'
Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 583 (citing Moragne, 398 U.S. at 387 (quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.
Md. 1865) (No. 12, 578))). See also id. at 588 (recognizing the decision to permit a longshoreman's
spouse to recover loss of society "is compelled if we are to shape the remedy to comport with the
humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show 'special solicitude' for those who are injured within
its jurisdiction") (footnotes omitted).
89. In 1873 the Court recognized the uniformity principle. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
558, 575 (1873) (holding that admiralty law should be "a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country.").
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959) ("It is true that
state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on
a harmonious system.") (citations omitted).
93. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988). See supra part II.A.
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created an action for the wrongful death of anyone killed on the high
seas.94 In addition, the Jones Ace5 created a cause of action for seamen
killed in the course of employment. Thus, Congress supplied to the
admiralty courts a uniform set of applicable rules and thereby averted the
chaos of as many varying statutes and recoveries for maritime wrongful
death as there were states.
C. The Moragne Wrongful Death Remedy
Decades later, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,96 the Court
created a right for seamen to recover for wrongful death under the general
maritime law.97 Necessitated by this creation of a general maritime
wrongful death remedy, the Court overruled a line of cases based upon The
Harrisburg,98 which stated the old maritime rule that, absent a statute,
there was no action for wrongful death in admiralty.99  The Court
concluded that through the simultaneous enactment of DOHSA and the
Jones Act Congress intended to achieve uniformity of admiralty jurisdiction
so that all seamen would have the right to recovery for the negligence of
their employers, regardless of the location of the death or personal
injury."e  Further, the Court noted, the concern for uniformity is a
recognition that the various state wrongful death acts had encroached upon
the "uniform vindication of federal policies" in admiralty law.11
According to Moragne, the reasons behind the need for uniformity of the
maritime law are the same reasons that must be balanced under the doctrine
of stare decisis. t° First, uniformity enables an individual to prepare for
the future without the worry of surprise. Second, uniformity furthers fair
and expedient litigation and adjudication. Third, uniformity bolsters the
94. See id. app. § 761.
95. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). See supra part ll.B.
96. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
97. Id. at 409.
98. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
99. Id. at 213.
100. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 400-01.
101. Id. at 401-02. Moragne relied on the uniformity principle to create the general maritime law
wrongful death and personal injury actions in the face of conflicting state wrongful death statutes. The
Court concluded that the recognition of the right to recover for wrongful death and personal injury
under general maritime law "will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing tensions and
discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively
maritime substantive concepts." Id. (citing Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960)) (footnotes
omitted).
102. Id. at 403.
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public's faith in the judiciary and its maritime law.1"3 These three
justifications for the uniformity doctrine must be considered when applying
Miles to the nonpecuniary claims of the seaman plaintiff against the
nonemployer third-party tortfeasor.0 4
D. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.
In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., the Court relied on the uniformity
doctrine to justify eliminating nonpecuniary awards in a wrongful death suit
brought under the general maritime law unseaworthiness cause of
action." 5 Essentially the Court reasoned that uniformity required that the
true seaman's wrongful death recovery under the judicially-created general
maritime law unseaworthiness cause of action cannot be greater than the
recovery allowed by the congressionally-approved statutory recovery in the
Jones Act for cases of death resulting from negligence. 0 6
First, Miles affirmed the existence of a general maritime cause of action
based upon unseaworthiness for the wrongful death of a seaman. 7
Second, the Court noted that the Jones Act' provides a negligence
action for the wrongful death or injury of a seaman against his employ-
er."° Further, the Court observed that an injured or killed seaman may
have a cause of action against the employer under the Moragne general
103. Id.
Among these are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of
individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with the assurance against untoward surprise;
the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to
relitigate every relevant proposition to every case; and the necessity of maintaining public
faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.
Id.
104. See infra parts V, VI.
105. 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
We have described Moragne at length because it exemplifies the fundamental principles that
guide our decision in this case. We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved
ones must look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection from injury
and death; Congress and the States have legislated extensively in these areas. In this era, an
admiralty court should look primarily to the legislative enactments for policy guidance. We
may supplement these statutory remedies where doing so would achieve the uniform
vindication of such policies consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep
strictly within the limits imposed by Congress .... Today we restore a uniform rule
applicable to all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the
Jones Act, or general maritime law.
Id. at 27-33.
106. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-33.
107. Id. at 23-27.
108. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
109. Miles, 498 U.S. at 27-30.
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maritime law for unseaworthiness" ° as well as under the Jones Act for
negligence."' Finally, the Court attempted to clarify the remedies and
damages available to the injured or killed seamen.
The Court in Miles acknowledged that it had previously permitted a
wrongful death dependent plaintiff to recover nonpecuniary damages in
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet."' But later, in Mobil Oil v.
Higgenbotham,"3 the Court narrowed the scope of its previous holding
to apply only to the wrongful deaths of longshoremen in territorial
waters." 4  The Court reasoned in Higgenbotham that by enacting
DOHSA, which expressly limits recovery to pecuniary damages,"'
Congress had spoken directly to the issue and it was not the role of the
Court to supplement the congressional intent." 6
The Miles Court next discussed the Jones Act, noting that the Jones Act,
unlike DOHSA, does not explicitly limit damages to pecuniary losses."7
The Jones Act, however, incorporated FELA"s which allows only for the
recovery of pecuniary damages." 9 Thus, the Court concluded that only
pecuniary damages may be recovered in a Jones Act negligence action
thereby eliminating the possibility of recovery for nonpecuniary damages
in Jones Act claims. 20
In addition to the above conclusions, the Miles Court explained its
concerns regarding uniformity between the bench-created remedies and the
congressionally-created remedies.'12  The Court concluded that the
judge-made case law and statutory maritime actions should be consistent,
particularly with respect to the issue of recoverable damages. 12  Given
110. Id. at 30 ("If there has been any doubt about the matter, we today make it explicit that there
is a general maritime cause of action for the wrongful death of a seaman, adopting the reasoning of the
unanimous and carefully crafted opinion in Moragne.').
11. Id. at 29 ("The Jones Act evinces no general hostility to recovery under maritime law. It does
not disturb seamen's general maritime claims for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness.").
112. Id. at 30. See Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1974).
113. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
114. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (citing Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-23).
115. 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1988).
116. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (citing Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625).
117. Id. at 32.
118. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988). See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
119. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
120. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-33.
121. Id. at 33-34.
122. Id. at 31 ("But in an 'area covered by the statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe
a different measure of damages than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class
of beneficiaries.") (quoting Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
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this conclusion in favor of uniformity as primary motivation, the Court
refused to grant more expansive remedies in a judicially-created cause of
action-general maritime law of unseaworthiness-than are available in the
congressionally-created cause of action-Jones Act negligence.' The
Court's final conclusion was that the holding in Miles restored "a uniform
rule applicable to all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether
under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or general maritime law."'124
Strictly interpreting the above-quoted phrase, then, Miles appears to have
reached a very definitive conclusion: there is to be no recovery of any
nonpecuniary damages by a Jones Act seaman if the suit results out of a
wrongful death regardless whether the suit is brought under a claim of
unseaworthiness or negligence. However, some district courts are asking
whether Miles may be read narrowly to deny recovery of nonpecuniary
damages only in suits brought against an employer"'s leaving open the
possibility of such recovery against third-party nonemployer defen-
dants. 2
6
IV. FULL RECOVERY AGAINST THIRD-PARTIES IN ANOTHER
FEDERALLY LEGISLATED NO-FAULT INJURY COMPENSATION SCHEME:
THE LONGSHOREMAN AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
Under existing law, it is clear the seaman plaintiff could only hope to
recover nonpecuniary damages by bringing a general maritime negligence
action against any allegedly negligent third party. The plaintiff would have
to prove the same elements of a land-based negligence claim in order to
recover full compensation.'27
Given the confusing nature of the maritime wrongful death remedy,'
it should not be surprising that neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has
yet tackled the problem of the seaman plaintiff and maritime third-party
liability. However, in a slightly different setting Congress and the courts
have established and administered a scheme, like that of the Jones Act,
which permits full statutory recovery under a strict no-fault liability theory
while, unlike the Jones Act, also allowing suits against a negligent third
party. This strict no-fault employer liability scheme is the Longshoreman
123. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-33.
124. Id. at 33.
125. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
126. See infra part V.
127. See supra part II.D.
128. See supra part II.
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and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).'29
A. The Longshoreman and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
The LHWCA provides compensation for the disability or death of "any
person engaged in maritime employment' ' 30 when the injury or death
occurs upon navigable waters of the United States'3' or "any adjoining
pier, wharf, dry dock.., or other adjoining area customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling or building a
vessel.' 32  The LHWCA is the exclusive remedy against the employer
for the longshoreman's wrongful death.'3 3  The LHWCA plaintiff may
recover death benefits, including compensation for the spouse and
dependent children, from the employer according to formulas specified in
the statute.13
4
B. The Section 905(b) Remedy
Unlike the Jones Act, however, section 905(b) of the LHWCA provides
a statutory cause of action for negligence against a third party, including
a wrongful death remedy.'35 The third-party cause of action is limited to
129. 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1988).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). Unconditionally excluded from coverage are (1) "a master or member
of a crew of any vessel"--they may rely on the Jones Act; and (2) "any person engaged by a master
to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G), (H).
131. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the Court held that state compensation could not reach
longshoremen injured seaward of the water's edge skirting piers and docks. This line was known as
the Jensen line. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Victory Carriers v. Law, 404
U.S. 202 (1971).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). In order to fall within the scope of the LHWCA coverage, the employee
must satisfy both the situs test of section 903(a) and the status test of section 902(3).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a).
The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative ... and
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on
account of such injury or death... In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense
that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, or that the employee
assumed the risk of his employment, or that the injury was due to the contributory negligence
of the employee.
Id.
134. 33 U.S.C. § 909.
135. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b).
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a
vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof,
may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of
section 933 of this title [detailing compensation], and the employer shall not be liable to the
vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the
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naming vessels as defendants.' 36 Essential elements necessary to invoke
section 905(b) include admiralty jurisdiction,13 1 that the wrong had a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity,138  and the
involvement of a "vessel."' 139 For recovery against a third-party vessel,
the successful 905(b) prima facie case must prove: "(1) that the vessel had
a duty to protect against the hazard; (2) that the shipowner breached that
duty; (3) that the plaintiff suffered injury; and (4) that the damages were
proximately caused by the defendant's breach of duty."' 40 Basically, the
longshoreman must satisfy the prima facie requirements of a standard
common-law tort claim.'14
The possible recovery available to the section 905(b) plaintiff is much
fuller than that permitted a true seaman under either the Jones Act or the
general maritime law of unseaworthiness after Miles.42
contrary shall be void .... The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based
upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The
remedy provided shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies
available under this chapter.
Id. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (holding a vessel owner liable for
damages under maritime tort law for his negligence causing injury to a worker).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). The plaintiff may sue against non-vessel negligent third parties for
wrongful death under the general maritime law if death occurred within state or territorial waters, or
under DOHSA if occurring beyond the three mile limit. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Of course, if there is no admiralty jurisdiction, nothing precludes the plaintiff from seeking relief under
the applicable state wrongful death and survival statutes.
137. To be eligible, the plaintiff must satisfy both the status test and the situs test. See supra note
132.
138. See, e.g., Christoffv. Bergeron Indus., 748 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that an injury
to a welder sustained when he fell through a hole on the deck of a barge which was resting on a marine
railway over a river was not within admiralty jurisdiction because the wrong had no significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity).
139. 33 U.S.C. 902(21) defines a "vessel":
Unless the context requires otherwise, the term "vessel" means any vessel upon which or in
connection with which any person entitled to benefits under this chapter suffers injury or
death arising out of in or in the course of his employment, and said vessel's owner, owner
pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter, or barge boat charterer, master, officer, or crew member.
Id.
140. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 6-10.
141. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 77, § 30.
142. A section 905(b) plaintiff may recover.
(1) medical and rehabilitation expenses (past and anticipated in the future); (2) pain and
suffering (past and anticipated in the future); (3) mental anguish and distress caused by
symptoms, treatment, inactivity, and changed self-image (past and future); (4) permanent
disability and disfigurement, if any; (5) impaired ability to enjoy life; (6) loss of earnings
(past and future); (7) spouse's loss of consortium; (8) punitive damages; and (9) prejudgment
interest.
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 6-10.
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Finally, the section 905(b) plaintiff is not required to elect between
section 903 employer compensation and section 905(b) third-party
compensation; both remedies may be pursued concurrently.
43
C. Mechanics for Insuring Equality Among the Parties
The LHWCA provides that after compensating the plaintiff, the employer
is permitted to sue the third-party vessel under a subrogation and assign-
ment of right theory.'" Further, the employer must be involved in all
settlement agreements between the plaintiff and the third party to insure
there is no double recovery or over-compensation of any one party.45
The employer also has an independent cause of action under the general
maritime law against a negligent third-party vessel. 46
D. Section 905(b) and the Jones Act Seaman
The LHWCA is evidence that Congress is capable of creating a federal
statutory scheme by which a wrongful death or personal injury plaintiff
may recover both from the employer and from a negligent third party
without compromising one recovery for the other. Moreover, the LHWCA
plaintiff is permitted to recover more than just the pecuniary damages
available to the Jones Act wrongful death plaintiff. Under the LHWCA
scheme, the wrongful death plaintiff is able to recover pecuniary losses
from the employer and nonpecuniary losses from the negligent third
party. 47 Thus, if Miles eliminated the true seaman's opportunity to
recover nonpecuniary damages in all general maritime law claims, then the
result is that the LHWCA plaintiff may find a fuller remedy under a
143. 33 U.S.C. § 933(a).
If on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable under this chapter
the person entitled to such compensation determines that some person other than the employer
or a person or persons in his employ is liable in damages, he need not elect whether to
receive such compensation or to recover damages against such third person.
Id.
144. See SCHOENBAuM, supra note 6, § 6-11.
145. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 6-12.
146. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 6-13. This is an independent, judicially-created general
maritime law cause of action known as a Burnside claim, based on Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v.
Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 409 (1969).
147. See supra part W.B. In fact, this district court specifically held that Miles does not reach to
the longshoreman's recovery for loss of spouse's society under section 905(b) in the general maritime
law. The court reasoned, however, that this result was due to the fact that the plaintiff was a
longshoreman under the LHWCA and not a seaman. The court did not address whether the outcome
would have been the same if the plaintiff had qualified as a seaman. Id.
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no-fault liability plan than his counterpart who qualifies for the Jones Act
remedy.
If, on the other hand, the true seaman had a comparable system of
recovery by which he could recover under a no-fault negligence scheme
from his employer and still seek nonpecuniary awards from negligent third
parties, then there would be no need to consider the sweeping statement of
Miles. But because the seaman does not have the statutory right to seek
recovery from the negligent third party, it is necessary to consider the few
post-Miles cases that have recently been decided in the federal district
courts. These decisions are helpful in determining whether a Jones Act
plaintiff may still seek nonpecuniary remedies from negligent third parties
under the general maritime negligence cause of action as well as no-fault
compensation from the employer under the Jones Act or the general
maritime unseaworthiness cause of action.
V. RECENT CASES PERMITTING AND DENYING JONES ACT SEAMEN
RECOVERY OF NONPECUNIARY AND PUNITIvE DAMAGES FROM
NONEMPLOYER THIRD-PARTY TORTFEASORS
The district courts are split regarding wrongful death recovery by a Jones
Act seaman from a negligent third party.'48 Since Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp.,"'49 there have been only three cases holding that a Jones Act
seaman could recover nonpecuniary damages in a general maritime law
wrongful death or personal injury action from a negligent third party.50
A. Rebstock v. Sonat Offshore Drilling
The first case to recognize nonpecuniary damages, Rebstock v. Sonat
Offshore Drilling,'5' came six months after the Supreme Court decided
Miles. In Rebstock, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
148. See supra note 18.
149. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
150. The three cases are: Rebstock v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, 764 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. La. 1991);
Mossa v. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mich. 1992); and Sugden v. Puget Sound Tug
Barge Co., 796 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
A pre-Miles case of some minor interest, Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421 (5th Cir.
1988), permitted recovery of nonpecuniary damages from an employer and third party on ajoint liability
theory based on unseaworthiness under the general maritime law. This case is notable for holding the
employer and third party jointly liable rather than for anything it says to the recovery of nonpecuniary
damages by a Jones Act plaintiff in the general maritime law. Nonetheless, it places the issue in some
historical context.
151. 764 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. La. 1991).
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held that a seaman's wife could seek loss of consortium damages in a
general maritime negligence action against a third party.' Acknowledg-
ing that the district courts in Louisiana had applied the Miles ban on
nonpecuniary damages to Jones Act plaintiffs suing under the general
maritime unseaworthiness theory,"'3 the court distinguished Rebstock
from Miles, noting that in Rebstock the plaintiffs did not assert a Jones Act
claim despite having Jones Act seamen status.'54 Instead the plaintiffs
asserted a general maritime law negligence action against the third-party
defendant drilling and oil companies.155 Finding that plaintiffs' status as
Jones Act seamen was irrelevant, the court ruled that plaintiffs could
recover loss of consortium damages because the general maritime law of
negligence was similar to the common law of negligence.
5 6
In distinguishing Miles, the court opined that the Miles court's emphasis
on uniformity did not prevent its ruling. The court viewed Miles as
creating a uniform rule for suits by seamen against their employers, without
considering the issue of seamen suing third parties. 57  The court in
Rebstock suggested that because of the LHWCA, to deny plaintiff the loss
of consortium damages under the general maritime law of negligence would
create the same type of inconsistency in maritime law that Miles had cured.
The court noted that section 905(b) of the LHWCA' 5' permits the spouse
of a longshoreman suing a nonemployer vessel for negligence to recover
loss of consortium damages. If such recovery were denied in the instant
case, the spouse of a Jones Act seaman suing a nonemployer for negligence
could not equally recover the loss of consortium damages.'59 The court
concluded that in the interest of uniformity, as expressed in Miles, the
152. Id. at 76.
153. Id. at 75 (citing Breland v. Western Oceanic, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. La. 1991); Anglada
v. Tidewater, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1990); Turley v. Co-Mar Offshore Marine Corp., 766
F. Supp. 501 (E.D. La. 1991); McGee v. Bean Dredging Corp., No. 90-0394 (E.D. La. March 8, 1991)),
Note, however, that unlike Rebstock, all of these "cases involved a Jones Act claim by the injured
seamen against the seaman's employer combined with claims for unseaworthiness under the general
maritime law." Id. at 75 n.l.
154. Id. at 75.
155. Id. at 75-76. The third-party defendants in Rebstock were Sonat Offshore Drilling and Amoco
Production Company. Id. at 75.
156. Id. at 76. The court relied on Tullos v. Resource Drilling, Inc., 750 F.2d 380, 386 (5th Cir.
1985), a pre-Miles case in which the Fifth Circuit allowed an injured seaman's spouse asserting a
general maritime law negligence claim against a third party to recover damages for loss of consortium.
Id.
157. Id.
158. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). See supra part IV for a discussion of the LHWCA.
159. Rebstock, 764 F. Supp. at 76.
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inconsistency may be avoided by allowing the nonpecuniary damages claim
to stand against the third-party defendants in negligence. 60
B. Mussa v. Cleveland Tankers
The second post-Miles case permitting recovery of nonpecuniary
damages from a third party is Mussa v. Cleveland Tankers. 6' The
Cleveland Tankers court held that a Jones Act seaman could assert a
punitive damages claim against a nonemployer third party under the general
maritime law for negligence. 62 The plaintiffs in Cleveland Tankers were
seamen aboard the MV Jupiter which was carrying a cargo of gaso-
line.'63 As the tanker unloaded its cargo at the third party defendant's
dock,'" the ship exploded into flames. As a result of the explosion and
ensuing fire, the ship broke loose from its moorings, drifted into the
navigation channel, and subsequently partially sank. 61 In response to the
plaintiffs' suit for punitive damages, the third party defendant moved to
dismiss based on Miles.'" The Cleveland Tankers court ruled that Miles
did not apply because, in its view, the Miles policy of uniformity for
wrongful death and personal injury actions was limited to situations in
which the Jones Act seaman sued his employer under related Jones Act and
general maritime law claims. 67  In contrast, the court noted that in
Cleveland Tankers, the plaintiff seamen claimed under a single maritime
negligence theory which does not have a statutory remedy different from
the remedy provided under the general maritime law.'68
160. Id.
161. 802 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mich.), claim dismissed, 791 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
162. Id. at 86.
163. See Petition of Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
164. Id. The dock was owned by Total Petroleum, Inc.
165. Id.
166. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. at 85.
167. Id. at 86.
168. Id.
Total's argument that Miles [controls] the present case goes too far. Such an argument seeks
to extend Miles' policy of uniformity to situations, such as the one presented in the cases at
bar, where Jones Act seamen are not suing their employer under related Jones Act and general
maritime law claims, but instead, are suing a third-party... under a single general maritime
claim of negligence. To wit, plaintiffs are suing [a third party] for their alleged negligence
in causing the accident giving rise to their injuries. In the action against [this third party] no
situation is presented where statutory law provides a remedy different then the remedy
provided under general maritime law, unlike the situation in Miles. As such, Miles does not
control the instant actions as to plaintiffs' claims against [the third party].
Id. at 86 & n. I (noting that "[n]o Jones Act claim is available against a nonemployer third party. 46
U.S.C. app. § 688.").
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Relying on Rebstock'69 for its holding, Cleveland Tankers explained
and dismissed three cases in which nonpecuniary damages claims were not
allowed in actions by Jones Act seamen against third parties. In the first,
Turley v. Co-Mar Offshore Marine Corp.,7' an injured Jones Act seaman
sued his employer and a third party for Jones Act negligence and general
maritime law unseaworthiness." t The plaintiff's wife sued for loss of
consortium." The court dismissed the nonpecuniary claim against the
employer on the basis of Miles.73 The Cleveland Tankers court, howev-
er, found that the Turley opinion did not clearly explain the justification for
dismissal of the nonpecuniary claim against the third party defendant.'74
Similar claims were presented in Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co.,'" the second case distinguished in Cleveland Tank-
ers. 176  In Donaghey, the court held that Miles compelled dismissal of
loss of consortium and service claims under either the Jones Act or the
general maritime law. 77  Although the Donaghey opinion failed to
indicate the relationship of the defendant third parties to the seaman
plaintiff, Cleveland Tankers inferred an employer-employee relationship
because the plaintiff in Donaghey had included a Jones Act negligence
action with his other claims.178
169. See supra part V.A.
170. 766 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. La. 1991).
171. Id. The plaintiff-seaman in Turley sustained injuries while employed by Co-Mar as crew on
the vessel M/V C/Enforcer. Plaintiffs alleged both negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness
under general maritime law. Id. The opinion, however, sheds little light on the third party's
relationship to the plaintiff or its role in the litigation.
Although there is no fact upon which to base the premise, it is possible that Turley's counsel made
the third party a defendant with an eye toward skirting Miles. Thus, Mrs. Turley, unable to recover
from the employer as mandated by Miles, would have a nonemployer deep pocket from which recovery
might he forthcoming.
172. Id. The original complaint was amended to add Mrs. Turley as plaintiff claiming for recovery
for loss of consortium, services and society. Id.
173. Id. at 502. In addition to its reliance on Miles, the district court also cited Anglada v.
Tidewater, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1990), which held "that there is no recovery for loss of
society in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman." Turley, 766 F.
Supp. at 501.
174. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. at 87.
175. 766 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. La. 1991).
176. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. at 87.
177. Donaghey, 766 F. Supp. at 504.
178. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. at 87 ("A conclusion that the defendants in both Turley and
Donaghey were employers of the seamen-plaintiffs may be inferred from the fact that in each action,
the seamen-plaintiff sued for negligence under the Jones Act-a claim raised by a seaman against his
employer."). The opinion relied on a pre-Miles case, Wheatley v. Gladden, 660 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th
Cir. 1981), for the proposition that "an employer-employee relationship is a necessary antecedent to a
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Finally, the district court in Cleveland Tankers expressly refused to
follow Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran.179
In Texaco Refining,' the Texas Supreme Court rejected a general
maritime claim for loss of society arising as a result of the death of a man
who was not a Jones Act seamen."8' The decedent was simply a "good
samaritan" crushed by the wake of Texaco Refining's passing boat while
trying to help another boatman.'82 The Texas Supreme Court held that
loss of society damages are unrecoverable under general maritime law due
to Miles.'83 Cleveland Tankers rejected the holding as an extension of
Miles into a "blanket rule" and refused to extend Miles beyond its plain
language. 184
C. Sugden v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co.
A third district court addressed the nonpecuniary recovery issue with
respect to nonemployer third-party tortfeasors in Sugden v. Puget Sound
Tug & Barge Co.'8 The decedent in Sugden,'86 a Jones Act seaman
working aboard a tug assigned to retrieve a barge from the third-party
defendant's dock, allegedly drowned as a result of the third-party
defendant's improper installation of a moon pool and cover.'87 On the
third-party defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the district
court held that the family of a deceased Jones Act seaman may recover
nonpecuniary damages from a nonemployer defendant in a general maritime
Jones Act negligence claim." 802 F. Supp. at 87.
179. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. at 87.
180. 808 S.W.2d 61 (Tex.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 301 (1991).
181. Texaco Refining, 808 S.W.2d at 63.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. at 87 ("Such a statement goes well beyond the above-detailed
facts of Miles and its reasoning by extending a blanket rule against loss of society claims in all general
maritime actions without any proffered reason for such a broad extension.").
185. 796 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
186. The Sugden plaintiffs were the estate and surviving family members of the deceased seaman.
The plaintiffs filed against both the employer Puget Sound Tug & Barge, owned by Crowley Maritime
Corp., and the third-party shipyard, Duwamish Shipyard, Inc. Although the opinion is not definitive,
it may be inferred from the repeated references to the decedent's status as a Jones Act seaman that the
plaintiffs proceeded under a Jones Act negligence action against the employer. Id. at 456.
187. The decedent died a particularly horrible death. It is alleged that Duwamish negligently
manufactured the cover on the newly-installed moon pool. Apparently, the cover failed to save the
decedent from falling into the depths of the moon pool where he drowned. Sugden, 796 F. Supp. at
456.
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law wrongful death action.'8
After a brief review of maritime wrongful death actions and Miles' focus
on the need for uniformity in admiralty, the court found that Miles did not
reach the instant issue of nonemployer third-party liability for nonpecuniary
damages.'89 The court noted that prior to Miles, in Sea-Land Services,
Inc. v. Gaudet,"9' the Supreme Court permitted a longshoreman's depen-
dent to recover nonpecuniary damages, including loss of society, suffered
as a result of a wrongful death in territorial waters under the general
maritime law."' The Sugden court recognized that Miles eliminated the
recovery for loss of society in a general maritime action for wrongful death
of a Jones Act seaman."9  Nevertheless, the district court ruled that
because a nonemployer owes a duty of reasonable care under the circum-
stances to the employee of a third party, and because no third-party suits
can be brought under the Jones Act, the duty of care applies without regard
to the decedent's status as a Jones Act seaman. 3 Thus, the court held
the principles of Miles do not apply and Gaudet controls." 4 In effect, the
court in Sugden allowed the decedent plaintiff to shirk his true seaman
status with respect to a third party in order to assure nonpecuniary
recovery.
D. Anderson v. Texaco, Inc.
Compare the three cases above with Anderson v. Texaco, Inc.,195
however, in which a different district court in the Eastern District of
Louisiana reached the opposite conclusion. In Anderson, the true seaman
plaintiff suffered injuries as the result of an explosion following third-party
mistakes made in the sequence of opening and closing high pressure gas
valves.' 96 Anderson sought a variety of compensatory and punitive
damages under the Jones Act, the general maritime law of negligence, and
the general maritime law of unseaworthiness. 9 7 The court sustained the
188. Sugden, 796 F. Supp. at 457.
189. Id.
190. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
191. Sugden, 796 F. Supp. at 456.
192. Id. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 30 (1990); see also supra part III.D.
193. Sugden, 796 F. Supp. at 457.
194. Id. The court also relied on Rebstock, 764 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. La. 1991), discussed supra in
part V.A.
195. 797 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La. 1992).
196. Id. at 532-33.
197. Id. at 533.
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defendant's motion to dismiss all of these punitive damages claims because
the court believed that Miles foreclosed such claims from a Jones Act
plaintiff.'98
After reviewing the reasoning found in Miles and some confirming post-
Miles caselaw,'99 the Anderson court adopted the general Miles principle
that actions under the Jones Act are limited to pecuniary losses alone.2"
Turning to the issue of punitive damages under the general maritime law,
the court stated that despite a different theory of recovery,201 the general
maritime law claims "encompass the same factual events and the same
injuries as their Jones Act claims.""2 2 The court in Anderson acknowl-
edged that punitive damages are available in admiralty under some
circumstances,0 3 but held that Miles compels the barring of punitive
damage awards when a Jones Act claim is merely realleged in terms of the
general maritime law of negligence and unseaworthiness.2 4
The court held that Miles stood for the "fundamental principle" that
judge-made remedies must be uniform with the remedies enacted by
Congress. 25 Accordingly, when Congress has addressed the remedies for
certain injuries, plaintiffs cannot look to the general maritime law as an
alternative source of remedies based on the same allegations.0 6 Thus, in
198. Id. at 536.
199. See id. at 534. The court recognized a split in authority regarding the reach of Miles to
general maritime claims, including a split among the district courts in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Id. (citing In re Matter of Waterman Steamship Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. La. 1992) (adopting
an expansive view of Miles); Logue v. Tidewater, Inc., No. 91-1109, 1992 WL 59409 (E.D. La. Mar.
17, 1992) (adopting a narrow view of Miles)).
200. Anderson, 797 F. Supp. at 534.
201. The theories of recovery, rather than being statute-based, are unseaworthiness and negligence.
See supra part II.C. for a discussion of an unseaworthiness claim. See supra part II.D for a discussion
of a negligence claim.
202. Anderson, 797 F. Supp. at 534.
203. Id. ("Punitive damages have long been awarded under the general maritime law against
defendants who engage in 'lawless misconduct' that amounts to 'gross and wanton outrage.") (citing
The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558 (1818); Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d
622, 626 (5th Cir. 1981)).
204. Anderson, 797 F. Supp. at 536.
205. Id. at 535. See supra note 105 for text of actual discussion in Miles.
206. Anderson, 797 F. Supp. at 535-36. ("[A]fter Miles, admiralty courts cannot view the general
maritime law as another life-bearing star in the litigation galaxy when determining the scope of
permissible relief in maritime cases.").
The Anderson court went on to chart a future course for other courts by requiring a court to:
first evaluate the factual setting of the case and determine what statutory remedial measures,
if any, apply in that context. If the situation is one addressed by a statute like the Jones Act
or DOHSA, and the statute informs and limits the damages that are recoverable, the statute
alone governs the remedy.
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Anderson, the court rejected the plaintiff's general maritime law claims
against the nonemployer third party for nonpecuniary damages because
based on an evaluation of the factual events, relief was available under the
Jones Act.
20 7
VI. AMENDING THE JONES ACT TO PROVIDE SEAMEN FULL RECOVERY
IN GENERAL MARITIME NEGLIGENCE
We return once again to Kenneth Sugden. As noted earlier, after Miles,
the only hope of Sugden's surviving beneficiaries to recover nonpecuniary
damages is through a general maritime negligence action against the third-
party defendant shipyard. As the case law now stands, Sugden's claim may
or may not survive a motion to dismiss. Some district courts would read
Miles narrowly to bar nonpecuniary damages only against an employer in
general maritime unseaworthiness claims."' Other courts, however,
would read Miles broadly, reasoning that the sweeping language in Miles
addressing nonpecuniary claims serves as a clear and unambiguous decree
against such remedies for Jones Act seamen.0 9 This split in authority is
unfair to all parties involved because it fails to promote the purposes
underlying the uniformity doctrine.10
The problem is not with the language of the Jones Act because it is
relatively clear on its face. The problem lies in what the Jones Act fails to
state in its plain language. The land-based law of torts recognized the
inadequacy of pecuniary damages only and now allows for the recovery of
both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. The time has come for the
Jones Act to leave the safe harbors of the nineteenth century and sail the
oceans of full wrongful death recovery.
A. Proposed Jones Act Amendment: Section 688(c)
The solution to the authority split is rather simple. The Supreme Court
has spoken with regard to nonpecuniary losses under the Jones Act,
Id. If the statute does not apply, then presumably recovery may be had on the precedent developed in
the general maritime law.
207. Id. The court also explicitly stated that "Merry Shipping has, indeed, been overruled." Id. at
535.
208. See, e.g., Rebstock v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, 764 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. La. 1991); Mossa v.
Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Sugden v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co.), 796
F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
209. See, e.g., Anderson v. Texaco, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La. 1992).
210. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27, 33 (1990).
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DOHSA, and general maritime unseaworthiness. The Miles holding does
not need to be disturbed. The answer to the question whether Miles applies
to bar Jones Act seamen from nonpecuniary recovery in general maritime
negligence from nonemployer third parties rests with Congress. Congress
must amend the Jones Act to explicitly permit any person qualifying as a
Jones Act seaman to recover nonpecuniary damages in general maritime
suits in negligence against any responsible party other than the seaman's
employer.21" '
The proposed amendment should appear as 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(c) and
read as follows:2"2
In the event of personal injury or wrongful death to a person covered under
this section caused by the negligence of a third party-not the employer,
owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer of the seaman's
vessel; and not the fellow servants or fellow employees of the seaman-then
such seaman, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason
thereof, may bring a general maritime negligence action against such party
in accordance with the concepts and precedents of the action, and the
employer shall not be liable to the third party for such damages directly or
indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void.
The liability of the third party under this subsection shall not be based upon
the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury
occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all
other remedies against the third party except remedies available outside of
this section.
The proposed subsection amendment is similar to that already existing
in section 905(b) of the LHWCA. Like that subsection, under the proposed
subsection the Jones Act seaman would benefit from a full recovery. In
211. The fact that Congress has not yet considered legislation to cure the anomaly addressed by this
Note should not lead to the conclusion that the problem is one of theoretical concern only. The lack
of a proposed solution similar to the one suggested by this Note is probably due to a general satisfaction
with the status quo and a fear of congressional meddling among those attorneys practicing maritime
personal injury. The defense bar would obviously oppose any Jones Act amendment which might result
in larger plaintiff recoveries.
The reasons behind the plaintiff bar's apathy, however, are more complex. Although the rational
reader may think that plaintiff attorneys would seek a method for faller recovery, there is a fear that
once Congress focuses its attention on maritime recovery, it might choose to eliminate the Jones Act
altogether rather than pass a full recovery amendment. Some practioners feel that given this possibility,
recovery under the Jones Act as it now exists has been adequate for almost ninety years and continues
to be satisfactory. Interview with Robert K. Udziela, Partner of Pozzi, Wilson, Atchison, O'Leary &
Conboy, in Portland Oregon (July 10, 1993).
212. The language of this proposed amendment closely resembles that of section 905(b) of the
LHWCA.
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addition to the traditional pecuniary damages available from the no-fault
Jones Act, a section 688(c) plaintiff would be able to recover "past and
anticipated pain and suffering; mental anguish and distress resulting from
the symptoms, treatment, inactivity, and past or future changed self-image;
permanent disability and disfigurement; impaired ability to enjoy life;
spouse's loss of consortium; and punitive damages. 2 '13 There are three
benefits to this proposed Jones Act amendment, it: (1) promotes uniformity;
(2) recognizes the "special solicitude" afforded seamen in the maritime law;
and (3) ends third-party insolation from tort liability.
B. Proposed Section 688(c) Will Promote Uniformity
First, the change would result in a more uniform maritime wrongful
death recovery than now exists. The uniformity principle and the Miles
Court's analysis support the alteration. The Miles Court recognized the
value of uniformity. The Court also recognized that the LHWCA falls
within admiralty jurisdiction. Congress saw fit to address the scope of
recoverable damages with respect to longshoremen injured while working
in an area of traditional maritime activity by enacting the LHWCA.
Congress chose to grant longshoremen the right to seek nonpecuniary and
pecuniary recovery under the general maritime negligence theory from a
third-party vessel which played a role in the infliction of the injury. Thus,
Congress knew the existing case law when enacting the measure. By the
same token, enacting the proposed section 688(c) would result in Congress'
insuring that Jones Act seamen and longshoremen, both of whom must
sustain injury within territorial waters to qualify and both doing traditional
maritime work within admiralty jurisdiction, receive equal, not disparate,
recovery.
214
C. Proposed Section 688(c) Will Encourage Admiralty Policy of
"Special Solicitude" Towards the True Seaman
Second, amending the Jones Act with section 688(c) encourages
continuation of the Court's traditional "special solicitude" toward
213. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 6-10.
214. Of course, uniformity could be furthered another step by amending DOHSA in the same way,
but there is no disparate treatment between longshoremen and seamen under DOHSA. In either case,
the plaintiff may only recovery for pecuniary losses. See supra part II.A. for a discussion of the
remedies available under DOHSA.
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seamen.2"5 Currently, the Jones Act seaman is at a disadvantage com-
pared to the longshoreman given the everyday dangers of the job. Miles
states that the seaman must no longer look to the courts for protection,"6
but where does that leave the seaman? The answer, of course, as Miles
indicates, is that the seaman must look to the Congress and the states for
substantive legal protection through legislation.2" 7 With the incorporation
of section 688(c) into the Jones Act, Congress will be accepting its
responsibility to continue the nation's long unspoken policy of "special
solicitude" to her seamen.
D. Proposed Section 688(c) Will End Third-Party Insulation from Tort
Liability
Third, amending the Jones Act will eliminate the third-party's insulation
from liability for its conduct, often times egregious and wanton, that may
contribute to or result in a seaman's wrongful death. In the case of
Kenneth Sugden, under some current interpretations of Miles, the defendant
shipyard would not owe any user of the barge, with its dangerous moon
pool, the duty to provide a safe cover. The shipyard could produce any
product for use solely by a seaman, no matter how ill-designed or
dangerous, and so long as a seaman is the only person injured, then there
is absolutely no liability consequence to the third party. And without
section 688(c) to clarify the rights of the seaman, the injured seaman will
recover far less for his injury or death than will the injured or dead
longshoreman. The seaman would be without any nonpecuniary recovery
against the shipyard, while his counterpart on the wharf has a full recovery.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although Miles clearly stands for uniformity in its reasoning and
conclusion, the ultimate result is that its broad language has created more
confusion rather than clarifying the rule. Despite the possibility that the
Court could resolve the issue itself, Congress must eventually address the
problem of maritime wrongful death in an effort to bring about equal and
fair treatment for all victims of maritime wrongful death. Amending the
Jones Act with proposed section 688(c) to allow the Jones Act seaman a
full recovery against nonemployer third-party tortfeasors under a general
215. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
216. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
217. Id.
19941
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 72:379
maritime negligence theory is the best solution to an unending disparity in
admiralty law.
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